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Comparative Statics of the Effects of Credit 








We compare the effects of government credit subsidies and guarantees on decreasing 
inefficiencies caused by principal-agent problems in the credit market in transition and 
posttransition economies. We show that guarantees and subsidies targeted to low-risk 
borrowers decrease efficiency, while those targeted to high-risk borrowers increase efficiency 
both in transition and in posttransition economies. Uniform nontargeted guarantees decrease 
the credit rationing or deadweight loss caused by collateral transfers. Uniform subsidies may 
be used to improve welfare in an economy subjected to credit rationing, but they do not have 
any effect on the size of collateral required in a posttransition economy.  
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  21. Introduction 
An important component of economic transition since 1989 has been the establishment of a 
dynamic and efficient small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector. The provision of 
start-up loan provisions for SMEs was a crucial precondition of such development. As 
opposed to large enterprises with a well-known credit history, the provision of loans to 
smaller, new enterprises was hindered by information asymmetry between lending agencies 
and aspiring entrepreneurs.  
In order to entice lending institutions to provide capital to entrepreneurs lacking 
established credit records and/or sufficient collateral, transition-country governments 
established various credit-supporting institutions. Governmental agencies such as the Slovak 
Guarantee and Development Bank, the Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank, 
or the Czech Support and Guarantee Agricultural and Forestry Fund assisted the development 
of SMEs on their respective domestic markets. Their major activities consist in the provision 
of loan guarantees, direct loans, and interest-rate subsidies.  
In this paper, we concentrate on the efficiency effects of loan guarantees and interest-
rate subsidies in a situation marked by entrepreneurs’ private knowledge about  their chances 
of success in the project for which they seek credit. We will look at this question from a 
historical perspective, comparing the situation during the initial phases of economic transition 
in the early nineties with the posttransition situation of the early twenty-first century.  
We use the technical approach of the informational economy, widely used in analyses 
of credit markets under informational asymmetries since the seminal Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) paper. In particular, we utilize the screening role of collateral provisions and credit 
rationing in overcoming the adverse-selection effects of borrower private information. Major 
papers on the information economics of credit markets include Chan and Kanatas (1985), 
Bester (1985, 1987, 1994), and Besanko and Thakor (1987a, 1987b). In addition, Schmidt-
Mohr (1997) analyzed different types of instruments for overcoming information 
asymmetries. These studies were primarily engaged in positive analyses of credit-market 
imperfections and, as such, were not concerned with government interventions toward 
alleviating these imperfections.  
The basic idea of informational asymmetry and its alleviation through screening 
contracts in credit markets has been empirically tested too. For example, Capra, Fernandez, 
and Ramirez (2001) found that separating the role of collateral, as predicted by screening 
models, fits the credit market both based on real data and on experimental simulations. The 
  3use of collateral and/or credit rationing as screening instruments in adverse-selection models 
was recently analyzed by Janda (2002, 2003). Stiglitz and Weiss’s (1981) approach was 
recently discussed and empirically applied by Minelli and Modica (2003) to regional policy in 
depressed regions of Italy, where structural adjustment and poverty-alleviation problems bear 
some resemblance to problems faced in transition economies such as Slovakia. A complex 
discussion of credit guarantees in the context of economic policy is provided by 
Gudger (1998) and Navajas (2001).   
In our paper, we take the form of contract as a given. We consider the so-called 
standard debt contract as introduced by Townsend (1979) in the framework of the costly state 
verification problem. The appropriateness of the standard debt contract in the adverse-
selection environment was first investigated by Innes (1993). Recently, Vauhkonen (2003) 
demonstrated that the standard debt contract is optimal as long as there is competition among 
lenders rather than a monopoly financier.  
2. The Model 
Our model provides an extension to the model introduced by Janda (2002). The model has 
two time periods, ex ante and ex post. While there were two classes of economic agents in the 
original model––lenders and borrowers (the latter also denoted as entrepreneurs here)––we 
add government as a third class of economic agent. The government is modeled as a 
benevolent body whose only concern is increased social efficiency and whose only role is to 
distribute exogenously determined lump-sum guarantees and interest-rate subsidies.  
The role of lenders is to provide the financial funds required by borrowers to realize 
their projects. Risk-neutral lenders are engaged in Bertrand competition, leading to zero 
profits on lent sources. The supply of funds facing lenders is perfectly elastic, so that the 
lenders have available any demanded amount of funds under the unit cost of ρ .  
There are two types of risk-neutral borrowers in this model, indexed as type 1 and type 
2. The two types are distinguished by their probability of successfully realizing their project, 
denoted as  12 01 δ δ <<< , and by their reservation utilities from not participating in the 
project, denoted as  1 bb 2 < . A type-1 borrower is labeled as a high-risk borrower and a type-2 
borrower as a low-risk borrower. The probability that the random borrower facing a lender is 
of type 1 is θ , which is the proportion of type-1 borrowers in the total population of 
borrowers.  
  4The borrower can either undertake one risky project, which yields  y  in the case of 
success and 0 in the case of a failure, or he may participate in some alternative activity, which 
yields an expected return of  ,  . When the project is completed, the outcome of the 
project is freely observed by both borrower and lender. This means there is no costly state 
verification problem in this model.  
i b {1 2} i∈,
In order to undertake the project, the borrower has to borrow a fixed amount of money 
from the lender. The size of this loan is normalized to 1. Each borrower is endowed with a 
nonstochastic endowment, W ρ < , which will become available ex post in the second period, 
regardless if the project will be undertaken or not and regardless of the outcome. This 
assumption means that the borrower’s own wealth is too low to finance his own project 
through a risk-free loan.  
The flow of funds from lenders to borrowers and the repayment of these funds is 
governed by standard debt contracts. This means that in the case of the success of the project, 
the lender receives a constant repayment R . In the case of failure, the lender receives the 
collateral  . Each lender offers two types of contract. Each contract is three-tuple,  C
() iii CR π ,, ,  , where  {1 2} i∈, i π  is the probability that the application of the borrower who 
chooses this contract will be satisfied and will receive credit;   is required collateral; and  i C i R  
is the interest factor (1 + the interest rate), which is equal to the required repayment because 
of our normalization of the loan size to 1.  
The expected utility of a borrower of type   who applies for a contract designed for a 
borrower of a type 
i
j  is, for notational simplicity, given as an incremental expected utility 
defined as [expected utility after applying for credit] - [utility in the case of nonparticipating]  
that is:  
  { [ ( ) (1 ) ] (1 )( )} ( ) ij j i j i j j i i Uy RC WW b W b π δδ π =− − − + + − + − + . . 
The expression in curly  brackets says the following: with the probability  j π  the loan 
is granted, after which the borrower gains  j yR −  in the event of success and loses collateral 
j C  in the event of failure. In the event of success, his endowment wealth W  remains intact. 
In the event of failure, it is reduced by the collateral loss,  j C . With the probability (1 ) j π −  
the loan is not granted which means that the entrepreneur keeps his endowment wealth, W , 
and engages in alternative activity, which gives him utility equivalent of  . As such, the 
expression in curly brackets expresses the expected utility of the entrepreneur conditional on 
i b
  5requesting the loan before the decision of the lender (to loan or not) is announced. The 
subtracted term (  is the utility obtained by the entrepreneur in the case he does not 
apply for a loan.  
) i Wb +
The expression for the expected utility of the entrepreneur may be simplified as:  
  [( )( 1 ) ] ij j i j i j i Uy RC b π δδ =− − − − .  (1) 
 
It should be noted that the expected utility formulation described above naturally leads to the 
inclusion of reservation utility term   into the expected utility function.   i b
The lender’s valuation of collateral is given as  i C β , where  (0 1) β ∈ ; . This means that 
any equilibrium involving collateral is not socially efficient, since the amount of (1 ) i C β −  is 
wasted. This waste of resources could be interpreted as any kind of dead weight of liquidation 
or losses caused by asset specificity.  
We assume that each project is socially efficient, that is  ii yb δ ρ >+. This implies that 
any equilibrium involving credit rationing with  1 i π <  is not socially efficient.  
The values of all parameters are known by borrowers, lenders, and government. The 
only informational asymmetry in the model is that ex ante lenders and government do not 
know the borrower type. Therefore, ours is an adverse-selection model.  
The expected profit to a lender on one loan provided to a borrower of a type   is, 
under this asymmetric information, given as:  
i
 [( 1 ) ii i i ii BR C ] π δδ β ρ = +− −.  (2) 
 
We assume that in the event a lender is indifferent between lending and not lending, he 
resolves this indifference in the favor of lending.  
The government can attempt to reduce the inefficiencies created by the use of collateral and 
by credit rationing by two types of interventions. Under the lump-sum-guarantees program, 
the government guarantees the payment of an exogenously determined lump-sum   in the 
case of zero return from a project. The contracted collateral is thus passed to the government. 
The expected profit, Equation (2), is modified as:  
i g
 [( 1 ) ii i i i i BR g ] π δδ ρ = +− −.  (3) 
 
  6The other considered type of intervention is an interest-rate subsidy,  , which is paid 
only in the case of a project’s success, as opposed to guarantees paid in the event of failure. 
While the subsidy reduces the interest rate paid by a borrower, we can treat it analytically, just 
like an exogenous supplement to a repayment to a lender. The expected profit, expressed as 
Equation (2), is then modified as:  
i s
 [( )( 1 ) ] ii i i i ii BR s C π δδ β =+ + − − ρ .  (4) 
 
The expected utility of a borrower, under both types of interventions, is still given by 
Equation (1) since the interventions influence the borrower’s utility only indirectly, through 
their impact on the lender’s profit.  
We assume that the government implements one intervention program at a time. We 
also assume that the legislative status of the interventions is such that all loans provided to 
borrowers in a certain line of business are subjected to a given intervention, that is, all lenders 
lending in a given area participate in a government program. It is not possible for the 
government to reject a subsidy or a guarantee for loans provided by some lenders when giving 
subsidies or guarantees to other lenders offering the same contract. The participating lenders 
are obliged to use government support schemes when offered.  
Assumptions about the probabilities of successfully completing a project in a given 
branch of a national economy, and regarding the opportunity costs of remaining in that branch 
of a national economy, which gave rise to our distinction of two market regimes, transition 








δ ≥ , then the model is in a transition-
economy regime; otherwise, it is in a posttransition-economy regime.  
This approach takes the relative chances of success in a given industry to be 




δ  as a constant, which is 
the same for both transition and posttransition economies. We assume success here to be 
related to personal factors, not to the state of the economy. On the other hand, we assume that 
opportunity costs are dependent on the state of the economy.  
We assume that transition leads to a major stratification of society: from state-imposed 
equality to market-driven inequality. During transition, there are substantial possibilities for 
people to either become very rich or very poor, depending on their abilities. We expect that 
this process of social polarization is much stronger in a transitional than in a developed 




b  is high. This 
  7assumption captures the notion that very able people––people with entrepreneurial skills––
will become wealthy ( ) and will form the upper class. People lacking entrepreneurial skills 
( ) will remain as working class or they will become unemployed. The possibility of 
becoming very rich or very poor during transition is also connected with huge structural 
changes underway in the economy. Because the pretransition economy was artificially led by 
central planning, and in a condition of isolation from world markets, a transitional economy 
often behaves quite unexpectedly. We expect that people with good entrepreneurial skill are 
good at identifying which sectors will be profitable and viable in the future.  
2 b
1 b
Once transition is realized, and as the economy stabilizes to the point of a “normal” 
posttransition market economy, the differences between opportunity costs narrow. The 
possibilities for sudden, “overnight” wealth are also gone. The structure of the economy is 
increasingly transparent and stabilized, so that it is largely evident which sectors are 





b  is lower than during transition.  
We define the dividing line between high relative differences in opportunity costs in 




δ . We thus 
assume that in posttransition period the relative difference in opportunity costs for good and 
bad entrepreneurs is not greater than their relative chances for success in the area in which 
they seek financing.  
3. The Solution of the Model 
In order to appreciate the effects of government interventions, we first introduce the 
properties of the model’s solution excluding government interventions, which are derived in 
detail by Janda (2002). We first mention the case when the lender has full information about 
the types of borrower; that is, when the lender is able to say whether the borrower is high or 
low risk ex ante. Janda proves that credit provision under full information is efficient in this 
case since collateral is not used and credit rationing is not applied. Consequently, there would 
be no need for government intervention.  
In the case when the risk level of the borrower is the private information of the 
applicant, Janda proves that asymmetric information leads to two kinds of inefficiency which 
call for government intervention: credit rationing in a transition economy, and, in a stabilized 
posttransition economy, it is the use of collateral that is accompanied by credit rationing if the 
  8collateral wealth of a borrower is lower than the collateral required to provide credit to all 
applicants. In a posttransition economy, this collateral wealth could be so low that the credit 
market breaks down. The solution of the optimization problem under asymmetric information 
is provided in the Appendix. In the following two sections, we analyze two types of 
government interventions directed at alleviating these inefficiencies.  
3.1. Lump-sum Guarantees 
The lender under asymmetric information does not know ex ante the risk class of a borrower. 
Due to competition, each lender attempts to offer to each type of borrower the best conditions 
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 (1 ) 0 ii i i Rg δ δρ + −− = ,  (5) 
  {1 2} i∈ ,.  
 
 
Equation (5) is a zero-profit condition for lenders, which explicitly prohibits cross-
subsidization. This means that it is not possible for lenders to suffer a loss on a contract to one 
type of a borrower and to enjoy a positive profit on a contract to another type. Zero-profit 
constraint puts a bind on the competitive ability of the lender to offer the most attractive 
contract to the borrower.  
Collateral is passed to the government. The government, in turn, guarantees the 
payment of an exogenously determined lump sum,  , in the event of zero return from a 
project.  
i g
  9By solving this optimization problem along the lines of the solution provided in the 
Appendix, we find the following characteristics of the optimal solution. The contract for a 
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While  i R
∗ for   in Equation (6) gives the interest-factor component of an equilibrium 
contract for a low-risk borrower, the remaining parts of the contracts are different in transition 
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δ < , and collateral is unconstrained, then:  
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δ < , collateral is constrained, and collateral wealth W is such that (IC2) is 
satisfied, then:  
  2 CW






















.  (12) 
As we mentioned previously, this solution of the model shows some inefficiencies, 
whose degree depends on the level of governmental intervention. In the cases of transition and 
posttransition economies with low levels of available collateral, the credit market is plagued 
by the credit rationing of low-risk borrowers. The extent of the credit rationing  2 π
∗ may be 
influenced by government support since  2 π
∗ depends on guarantees   and   both in  1 g 2 g
  10Equations (8) and (12). Similarly, the extent of the other possible inefficiency—the required 
collateral in a posttransition economy—may be regulated by the government’s choice of 
intervention parameters   and  , which both enter Equation (9).   1 g 2 g
The optimal solution to the optimization problem above exhibits the following welfare 
properties: 
  
The utility of a high-risk borrower supported by a lump-sum guarantee is given as:  
  11 1 1 1 1 (1 ) Uyb g δ ρδ = −−+−  
 
The utilities of low-risk borrowers are given according to the following three cases:  
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2.  Posttransition economy with unconstrained collateral:  
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3.  Posttransition economy with binding collateral restriction and with wealth W 
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From the solution of the lender’s optimization problem we are able to determine the 
main general qualitative effects of the government guarantees: guarantees to low-risk 
borrowers decrease efficiency, guarantees to high-risk borrowers relax an incentive-
compatibility constraint and consequently increase an  efficiency, and uniform non-targeted 
lump-sum guarantees are welfare-improving.  
Below we show these efficiency results formally according to the three cases outlined 
above, and we provide the relevant economic intuition connected with each. We first deal 
with a transition economy.  








δ ≥ ), then:  
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This shows that lump-sum guarantees targeted to a high-risk borrower decrease the 
credit rationing of a low-risk borrower. This effect is caused by relaxing the incentive-
compatibility constraint for the high-risk borrower. As long as the contract targeted to the 
high-risk borrower is made more attractive by a provision of government support, the 
incentive for the high-risk borrower to pretend to be low-risk borrower and to take a low-risk 
borrower’s contract is decreased. It means that instead of making a low-risk borrower’s 
contract unattractive to a high-risk borrower by imposing credit rationing, we may achieve the 
incentive compatibility by improving the terms of the high-risk contract through the use of a 
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∂ −− +
0 .  
 
This means that lump-sum guarantees targeted to a low-risk borrower increase the 
credit rationing of a low-risk borrower. This is because the guarantees for a low-risk borrower 
make his contract more attractive. In order to satisfy the incentive constraint for a high-risk 
borrower, the low-risk borrower’s contract has to be made less desirable. This is achieved by 
increasing the credit rationing of the low-risk borrower.  
These results show that the targeting of guarantees to low-risk borrowers is 
counterproductive. But it remains to be seen what happens when both types of borrower 
obtain the same guarantee. We need to establish which of the two incentive effects described 



































































This shows that the positive effect of improving the contract for the high-risk borrower 
is stronger than the negative effect of making the contract of the low-risk borrower more 
  12attractive. Therefore, we conclude that nontargeted credit guarantees increase social 
efficiency since the credit rationing of a low-risk borrower is decreased.  
Next, we will deal with targeted and uniform guarantees in posttransition economies. 
























This means that lump-sum guarantees provided to a high-risk borrower decrease the 




















From this we see that the lump-sum guarantees provided to a low-risk borrower 
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This implies that uniform lump-sum guarantees have a positive social-efficiency effect 
since they lead to a lower collateral requirement. The incentive effects on collateral 
requirements are qualitatively the same as the incentive effects connected with credit-
rationing requirements.  
Finally, we consider the case of a posttransition economy with a low level of available 
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From this we see that lump-sum guarantees targeted to a high-risk borrower decrease 
the credit rationing of a low-risk borrower.  








































Lump-sum guarantees targeted to a low-risk borrower are counterproductive since 
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Untargeted lump-sum guarantees decrease the volume of credit rationing of a low-risk 
borrower provided that the available collateral wealth is low enough that it satisfies Equation 
(13).  
In the situation without government support, it could happen in the posttransition 
economy that the available collateral wealth would be too low to satisfy Equation (13). This 
would lead to the nonexistence of equilibrium. This extremely inefficient case of credit-
market break up may be precluded by sufficiently high government intervention since the 
properly designed guarantee leads to the decrease of the collateral requirement.  
3.2. Interest-rate Subsidies 
This section closely follows the structure of the preceding section to facilitate easy 
comparisons of both types of government intervention.  
The maximization problem is the same as in the case with lump-sum guarantees. The 
only change is in the zero-profit condition for lenders, where Equation (5) is replaced by:  
 () ( 1 ) ii i i i Rs C δ δβ ρ + +− −= .  (14) 
 
The subsidy is paid only in the case of the project’s success, as opposed to guarantees, 
which are paid in the event of failure. The subsidy is just an exogenous supplement to a 
repayment to a lender.  
In all cases, part of the equilibrium solution with interest-rate subsidies is given by:  













=, =, = −. i s  (15) 









δ ≥ , then:  
  2 0 C





























δ <  and collateral is unconstrained, then:  
 




(1 ) (1 )
ss
C
) ρ δδ δ δ





  2 1 π











δ < , collateral is constrained, and collateral wealth W is such that (IC2) is 
satisfied, then:  
  2 CW
∗ = ., (20) 
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The welfare properties of this optimal solution are given in the following paragraphs. 
The utility of a high-risk borrower under the interest-rate-subsidies intervention is:  
  11 1 1 1 1 Uyb δ ρδ = −−+ . 
 
The utilities of low-risk borrowers are given according to the following three cases.  























2.  Posttransition economy without collateral restriction:  
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3.  Posttransition economy with constrained collateral and with collateral wealth 
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The qualitative nature of the targeted interest-rate subsidies to low- or high-risk 
borrowers is similar to the case of guarantees.  
The main qualitative features of the optimal solution of the optimization problem are 
that: The uniform subsidies in the transition economy and in the posttransition economy with 
a binding collateral decrease credit rationing. As opposed to guarantees, the uniform subsidies 
do not have any effect on the size of the collateral required in a posttransition economy.  
The formal comparative statics and economic intuition on which these welfare results 
are based are presented here. We first consider the transition economy.  
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This means that interest-rate subsidies targeted to a high-risk borrower decrease the size of the 
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  16The implementation of untargeted subsidies by the government leads to a decrease in 
the credit rationing of a low-risk borrower. This is because from the point of view of high-risk 
borrower the untargeted subsidy improves the desirability of both types of contracts, but the 
desirability of the low-risk contract is increased less than the desirability of high-risk contract. 
Therefore there is not needed so much credit rationing as a part of low-risk borrower’s 
contract for keeping high-risk borrower satisfied with the contract designed for him. 
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which means that interest-rate subsidies to a high-risk borrower decrease the collateral 
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On the other hand, the subsidies provided to the low-risk borrower increase the 
collateral required of him.  
We next consider a scenario in which the government provides untargeted interest-rate 
















As opposed to the other scenarios analyzed in this section, under this government 
policy we were surprised to observe that untargeted interest-rate subsidies are powerless since 
the uniform increase in subsides has no effect on the collateral requirement. This result is 
because the amount of collateral required is influenced by the subsidy differential between 
low- and high-risk borrowers. As long as this differential is zero, the subsidies provided to 
both types of borrower do not affect incentives.  









δ < ), collateral is constrained, and collateral wealth W is such that (IC2) is satisfied. 
  17Under these conditions, the three approaches to the targeting of subsidies considered in this 
paper generate the following results  
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The interest-rate subsidy targeted to a high-risk borrower decreases the credit rationing 
of a low-risk borrower.  
 
12 1 1 2
22 1
21 1 1 1 1
[( 1 ) ( 1 ) ] 2








δδ δ δ δ β
δδ





∂− − + −
=<
∂ −− − +
.  
 
The subsidy targeted to a low-risk borrower increases the credit rationing of the 
targeted borrower and, consequently, it is not a desirable policy option.  
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⇒> . . Therefore, we 
conclude that uniform subsidies lead to a decrease in the credit rationing of a low-risk 
borrower in this case.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper introduced government interventions into a model of credit provision under 
asymmetric information. The aim of these modeled interventions was to alleviate the 
inefficiencies in credit markets caused by borrower private information. The inefficiencies are 
  18credit rationing and the deadweight costs connected with the transfer of collateral in the event 
of the failure of a collateralized project. In accordance with empirically observed types of 
interventions, we concentrated on two kinds of government intervention: credit guarantees 
and interest-rate subsidies.  
We compared these two intervention mechanisms in the framework of two regimes 
relevant for transition economies. First, we considered the transition environment of the early 
nineties, when major structural changes occurred both as regards the economy and the welfare 
of people. It was a time when some people with sharp entrepreneurial abilities became 
wealthy relatively quickly while others found that, lacking such abilities and due to structural 
changes, they were forced out of or into new employment situations and slipped down the 
social ladder. We also considered the posttransition environment of the years preceding the 
2004 EU expansion, when the situation in the economy stabilized and the opportunities for 
people were not so radically different as in early transition.  
We considered two ways of providing subsidies and guarantees. One is to provide 
uniform subsidies for all borrowers. This is a very attractive specification since it minimizes 
the discretion of the government and simplifies the provision of government support. We also 
considered government support targeted to different types of entrepreneurs, as revealed by 
their choice of contract as offered by lenders.  
This assumption that the government is able to target support is quite in accord with 
the desire of many governments to fine-tune and better address policy. We would like to 
emphasize that the option of targeting credit support does not require more information on the 
side of government about the identities of the loan applicants as compared with the 
information available to the commercial lenders. It only requires the full rationality and full 
foresight of all involved players. We assume that the government is able to determine the 
optimal packages offered by commercial lenders. The government then targets its support by 
assigning it to an offered package, not to some "cheap talk" declaration by a borrower with 
regards to his type.  
Based on such distinctions, we showed that the guarantees and subsidies targeted to 
low-risk borrowers decrease efficiency, while those targeted to high-risk borrowers increase 
efficiency both in transition and posttransition economies. Further, we proved that uniform, 
nontargeted guarantees improve welfare. We also proved that uniform subsidies may be used 
to improve welfare in an economy subjected to credit rationing, too, but we obtained the 
interesting result that they do not have any effect on the value of collateral required in a 
posttransition economy. Therefore, we conclude that guarantees and subsidies have, in the 
  19majority of cases, qualitatively similar effects. Nevertheless, guarantees are a more robust 
instrument in situations where policymakers are not sure whether the economic environment 
corresponds more to a transition or posttransition economy.  
This paper did not engage in a cost-benefit analysis of interest-rate subsidies and loan 
guarantees. It also did not consider the problems of determining the value of collateral for 
government or the quantification of collateral transfer costs connected with collateralized 
loans. In particular, we did not consider the government spending necessary for the guarantees  
in relation to the subsidies needed to achieve the same effect of decreasing the level of 
collateral or credit rationing by some fixed, predetermined amount. These are left for future 
research.  
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Appendix - The Solution of the Asymmetric Information 
Problem 
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Equation (A1) is a zero-profit condition for lenders that explicitly prohibits cross-
subsidization. This means that it is not possible for lenders to suffer a loss on a contract to one 
type of borrower and to enjoy a positive profit on a contract to another type of borrower.  
The solution to this problem consists of four possible cases, which we label as Cases A to D.  
The equilibrium contract for a high risk borrower in cases A, B, and C is identical with the 
high-risk-borrower’s contract under full information; that is:  
1 11 1 01 CR
ρ
δ π
∗∗ ∗ =, =, = .   
Case A:  








δ ≥ . An equilibrium contract of a low-
risk borrower is given by:  
































The equilibrium value of   means that there is always credit rationing in the case of a 
competitive credit market under asymmetric information in a transition economy.  
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Case C:  








δ < , with an additional 
provision that the collateral is constrained by the level of wealth which is of an intermediate 
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In this case the low-risk borrower’s contract is given by:  
 





11 2 1 1
11











































  22 
Case D:  
In the case of a stabilized economy with a very low level of wealth, which does not satisfy 
Equation (A3), a restriction, the credit market breaks down and no lending is realized, 
 .  12 0 ππ
∗∗ == .
Proof: 
We assume that  0 i π >  and that (IC2), (IR1), and (IR2) will not be violated by the solution. 
We will check these assumptions after we obtain the solution.  
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Kuhn-Tucker conditions are FOC:  
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and (IC1), 0 1 0 ii CW π <≤ , ≤≤ ,  complementary slackness conditions, and nonnegativity of 
multipliers.  
First we show that  1 0 C
∗ = .  
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Substituting equilibrium values of  11 C π
∗ ∗ , , and  1 R
∗ into the utility function of a high-risk 
borrower, we get:  
  11 1 1 0 Uyb δ ρ = −−> ,  
which shows, that an individual rationality constraint (IR1) is satisfied.  
Now we will discuss three possibilities (denoted as Cases A, B, C) with respect to an optimal 
choice of     2 C .
Case A.  
Consider     2 0 C =.
We know that  2 1 π <  since the full information solution is not incentive compatible with 
(IC1).  
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which agrees with our definition of a transition economy.  













































Substituting equilibrium values of  22 C π
∗ ∗ , , and  2 R
∗ into the utility function of a low-risk 
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which proves that the individual rationality constraint (IR2) is satisfied.  
Case B.  
Consider an interior solution with respect to  22 4 0 C τ τ ⇒== ⇒  
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We assume that  2 1 π = . To obtain the conditions under which this assertion is valid, we 
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Expanding the left-hand side of Equation (A7) and collecting terms, we get:  
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Adding and subtracting  12 b δ  to Equation (A8), we get:  
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which agrees with our definition of a stabilized economy.  
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Next we have to check if the (IC2) is satisfied.  
We directly substitute the values  11 2 0 C 1 π π = ,= =  into (IC2):  
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  26Substituting for   from Equation (A11) and for  2 C 12 R R ,  from the zero-profit condition of 
Equation (A1), we get:  
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The left-hand side of Equation (A12) can be simplified as  
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which shows that (IC2) is satisfied.  
The individual rationality constraint of type-2 borrower is satisfied if  
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We show that the individual rationality constraint (Equation [A13]) is satisfied under the 
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From the binding constraint (IC1), we have:  
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The right-hand side of Equation (A14) can be rewritten as:  
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Substituting Equation (A15) for the right-hand side of Equation (A14) and rearranging, we 
obtain:  
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Substituting equilibrium values of  12 R R
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∗ into the right-hand side of 
Equation (A16) and subtracting   from both sides of that equation, we get:   2 b
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Using Equation (A18), the right-hand side of Equation (A17) can be rewritten as:  
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Case C.  
If   given by Equation (A11) is bigger than W, we have a corner solution   Using 
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We check if  
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satisfies (IC1). We substitute a candidate solution (Equation [A20]) into (IC1) and simplify:  
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(IC1) has to hold as an equality.  
We express  2 π
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As a last step, we find which values of wealth W  satisfy (IC2).  
By substituting equilibrium values of  121 CC ππ
∗ ∗∗∗ , ,, into (IC2), we get the following 
inequality:  
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Because the denominator of the right-hand side of Equation (A23) is positive, we can rewrite 
it as:  
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Collecting the terms with W , we get:  
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Under the assumption that the expression in square brackets on the left hand side of Equation 
(A24) is positive, we get Equation (A3), a restriction, on W, under which (IC2) is satisfied.  
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  29We rewrite Equation (A25) as:  
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This proves that the inequality of Equation (A25) is true.  
To prove the inequality of Equation (A26), we multiply its terms out,  
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then we collect the terms,  
   
2
22 1 1 2 (1 ) (1 ) 0 δβ δ β δβ δδ β +− − − − >
and we get  
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which simplifies as  
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which is obviously positive.  
The individual rationality constraint (IR2) for the low-risk borrower is satisfied since  
    22 2 2 2 2 [( 1 ) ( 1 Uy b πδ ρ δ β
∗ =− − − − −
where  2 π
∗ is positive, and the term in the square brackets is bigger than the corresponding 
term in Equation (A13), which was proved to be nonnegative.  
Q.E.D.  
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